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Abstract: 
This article examines how and when democracy entered the discursive politics of the 
Community to finally become one of the fundamental tenets of European political 
identity - and in the process influenced how decision-makers approached the question of 
enlargement. Building on multiple archival sources, the article traces how all three 
Community institutions (Commission, Council and the European Parliament) legitimized 
the expansion and continuation of the process of European integration through the 
discursive construction of democracy. It will focus on the debates elicited by the 
attempts of Southern European countries to accede to the EEC in the 1960s and 1970s: 
the rebuttal oI 6SDLQ·V LQLWLDO RYHUWXUHV LQ  WKH FKDOOHQJH RI *UHHFH ² the 
&RPPXQLW\·V ILUVW $VVRFLDWH PHPEHU ² being taken over by a military dictatorship in 
1967, the democratizing of Greece, Spain and Portugal after the fall of their respective 
dictatorships in the 1970s and finally the formalisastion of such democratic ideas in the 
Declaration on Democracy of 1978 
 
Introduction 
Questions of democracy, legitimacy and shared values in Europe have existed long 
before the genesis of the European Community (EC). All of these questions essentially 
DPRXQW WR D VLQJOH RYHUDUFKLQJ TXHVW WR GHILQHZKDW ¶(XURSH· LV1 Assumptions about 
shared cultural and religious values have always underpinned the idea of European 
integration ² certainly in the eyes of the founding fathers of the EC.2 Nonetheless, over 
the course of its history, and in fits and starts, the European Community has aspired to 
develop what is first and foremost a community of political principles values. This is 
particularly true every time a new aspiring member state lodges its application to join the 
                                                        
1 )RUDGLVFXVVLRQRIKRZWRGD\·V(XURSHDQ8QLRQKDVSURJUHVVLYHO\DSSURpriated the discursive space of 
¶(XURSH·VHHRichard Hermann, Thomas Risse-Kappen and Marilynn Brewer, Transnational Identities² 
becoming European in the EU (New York: Rowan and Littlefield, 2004). Although this is not the focus of this 
DUWLFOHLWLVSRVVLEOHWRWUDFHKRZ((&DFWRUVVORZO\VWDUWHGWREXLOGWKHHTXDWLRQRI¶(XURSH·ZLWKWKHLU
own institutions over the course of the first two decades of its existence. See also Emma De Angelis, ¶7KH
(XURSHDQ3DUOLDPHQW·V,GHQWLW\'LVFRXUVHDQG(DVWHUQ(XURSH-·Journal of European Integration 
History, 17,1 (2011), 103-117. 
2 (PPD'H$QJHOLV¶The political discourse of the European Parliament, enlargement, and the 
construction of a European identity, 1962 ² 2004·, PhD thesis, The London School of Economics and 
Political Science, 2011. 
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EC and HQWHU¶(XURSH·3 (YHUVLQFH%ULWDLQ·VLOO-fated application in 1961, the question of 
enlargement has been intrinsically linked to the question of European identity: deciding 
which countries had the right to become members of the EC/EU, and on what basis, 
SOD\HG D FUXFLDO UROH LQ WKH HPHUJHQFH DQG HYROXWLRQ RI WKH H[LVWLQJ RUJDQL]DWLRQ·V
identity. The definition of what European identity amounts to is at the very least 
extremely controversial and cannot be addressed here: what this article focuses on 
instead is the way in which EC actors - the Council of Ministers (Council), the European 
Commission (Commission) and the European Parliament (EP) - progressively defined a 
JHQHUDO FRQFHSW RI ¶EHLQJ (XURSHDQ· IRU the specific purposes of joining the 
Community.4 
This article seeks to unravel a specific ² and crucial ² aspect of this identity: the 
democratic elements underpinning its political values, as defined by the key political and 
institutional actors involved in the enlargement of the Community to Southern European 
countries in the 1960-70s. It does so by focusing in particular on how and when 
democracy entered the discursive politics of the European Community to finally become 
one of the fundamental tenets of the European self-image - and in the process influenced 
how decision-makers approached the question of enlargement. The analysis of newly 
released documents of major member states and EC institutions and of the untapped 
source of the debates of the European Parliament shows how, in response to states 
seeking EC membership, the Commission European, Council and Parliament slowly ² 
and at times grudgingly ² used reference to ¶democracy· to legitimize the expansion and 
continuation of the process of European integration. From a general discussion in the 
EP in the 1960s, the idea slowly percolated through to the policy-makers, influencing 
their response to the requests presented by newly democratic Southern European states 
                                                        
3 The concept of identity is subject to ongoing scrutiny and debate across a variety of disciplines ² with 
¶(XURSHDQLGHQWLW\·DOWHUQDWLYHO\EHLQJDSSURDFKHGDVDQLGHQWLW\FUHDWHGE\SROLWLFDOOHDGHUVRQHLGHQWLILHG
E\VFKRODUVDFURVVFHQWXULHVRIKLVWRULFDODQGFXOWXUDOGHYHORSPHQWVRUWKHLGHQWLILFDWLRQZLWK¶(XURSH·
and/or the EU among specific communities. The literature is vast but some examples include: Michael 
Bruter, Citizens of Europe? The emergence of a mass European identity (Basingstoke, New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2005); Bo Strath, Europe and the Other and Europe as Other (Brussels: PIE Lang, 2001); Jeffrey T 
Checkel and Peter J Katzenstein, European Identity (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Richard 
Herrmann,Thomas Risse  and Marilyn Brewer, eds., Transnational Identities: Becoming European in the EU 
(Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004); Gerard Delanty, Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality (Basingstoke: 
3DOJUDYH0DFPLOODQ.ODXV(GHU¶$WKHRU\RIFROOHFWLYHLGHQWLW\0DNLQJVHQVHRIWKHGHEDWHRQD
´(XURSHDQLGHQWLW\µ·European Journal of Social Theory 12,4 (2009), 427-447. 
4 For ease of reference, the article will refer to the European Economic Community as European 
Community (EC), the Council of General Affairs as the Council, and the European Parliamentary 
Assembly as the European Parliament (EP) (as the institution chose to call itself in 1962). 
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in the 1970s. The concept of democracy used in this context was closely associated with 
WKH LGHDRI ¶UHVSHFWIRUKXPDQULJKWV·DQGWKHUXOHRI ODZ WRD ODUJHH[WHQWGHPRFUDF\
was understood to signify a system based on the respect and protection of the human 
rights that the Community wished to uphold. The two concepts were often conflated 
into an all-encompassing idea of democratic principles in the institutional and political 
discourse of the 1960s and 1970s. Rather than tracing both as separate ideas, the article 
will look at the overarching DUWLFXODWLRQRIWKH(&·VSROLWLFDOLGHQWLW\,WZLOOIRFXVRQWKH
debates elicited by the attempts of Southern European countries to accede to the EEC in 
WKH V DQG V WKH UHEXWWDO RI 6SDLQ·V LQLWLDO RYHUWXUHV LQ  WKH FKDOOHQJH RI
Greece ² the &RPPXQLW\·V ILUVW $VVRFLDWH PHPEHU ² being taken over by a military 
dictatorship in 1967, and the difficulties of dealing with the democratizing of Greece, 
Spain and Portugal after the fall of their respective dictatorships in the 1970s.5 Finally, it 
will analyse how these ideas were formalised in the Declaration on Democracy issued in 
1978.6 
Political scientists have claimed that the debates articulated around the question 
of enlargement gradually shaped a political identity based on the idea of democracy, 
ZKLFKKDGQRWRULJLQDOO\EHHQSDUWRIWKH(&·VVHOI-LPDJH)RULQVWDQFH'DQLHO7KRPDV·V
DQDO\VLV RI WKH UHDFWLRQ WR 6SDLQ·V ELG IRU DVVRFLDWLRQ LQ  VXJJHVWV WKDW WKH
identification of Europe as a promoter of fundamental democratic principles did not 
VWDUWZLWK WKH ¶GUDIWLQJRID WUHDW\RU WKHFUDIWLQJRIDFRXUWRSLQLRQ·EXWZDVJUDGXDOO\
and commonly articulated through the enlargement process.7 Frank Schimmelfennig uses 
WKH LGHDRI ¶UKHWRULFDOHQWUDSPHQW· WRGHVFULEH WKHZD\ LQZKLFK WKHQRUPVYDOues and 
collective identity constructed through discourse can be used strategically by political 
actors to advance their interest.8 Uli Sedelmeier reprised this analysis in his work on the 
(XURSHDQ8QLRQ·V(DVWHUQ(QODUJHPHQW9 Thomas Diez goes even further, arguing in his 
                                                        
5 In the 1970s, European actors often grouped Spain and Portugal together whenever the issue of 
¶democracy·DQGSROLWLFDOSUDFWLFHV was under scrutiny. In spite of the obvious differences, the treatment of 
the political identity question was remarkably similar across the three countries ² being the first country to 
go through the process, Greece was also the one that first gave rise to questions about the political 
dimensions of enlargement. Much of what follows will therefore focus on Greece as a key case study.  
6 Conclusions of the Sessions of the European Council (1975-1990), Copenhagen 7-8 April 1978, Archive 
of European Integration, University of Pittsburg. 
7 7KRPDV'&¶&RQVLWXWLRQDOL]DWLRQWKURXJK(QODUJHPHQWWKHFRQWHVWHGRULJLQVRIWKH(8·6GHPRFUDWLF
LGHQWLW\·Journal of European Public Policy, 13,8 (2006), 1190-1210.  
8 )UDQN6FKLPPHOIHQQLJ¶7KH&RPPXQLW\7UDS/LEHUDO1RUPV5KHWRULFDO$FWLRQDQGWKH(DVWHUQ
(QODUJHPHQWRIWKH(XURSHDQ8QLRQ·International Organization 55,1 (2001), 47-80. 
9 Ulrich Sedelmeier, Constructing the path to Eastern enlargement: the uneven policy impact of EU identity, 
0DQFKHVWHU0DQFKHVWHU8QLYHUVLW\3UHVV9HUQH\KDVGHDOWZLWK((&·V6RXWKHUQ(XURSHDQ
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analysis of language in the construction of the European Union that the terms used to 
describe the EU by politicians and academics alike are not merely descriptive, but 
influenced the way in which the EU developed in the first place.10 Thus, the general 
consensus in political science is that discourse (for instance that of the media, EC 
political and institutional actors, and leaders and politicians of the aspiring member 
states) is important for understanding ideas and self-images of Europe that exist within 
the European political arena.11 However, so far no thorough historical examination of 
this claim based on the scrutiny of primary sources has been put forward. It is only 
through a historical approach that looks at change over a protracted period of time that it 
is possible to understand how this discourse emerged, was articulated and adapted over 
WLPH DV WKH(&·VSROLWLFDO DQG LQVWLWXWLRQDO DFWRUV VRXJKW WR VKDSH WKHLUSROLF\ WRZDUGV
applicant states. 
 
The EP introduces the idea: the Birkelbach Report 
Far from always being a dominant feature of European political discourse, democracy 
was in fact no mentioned anywhere in the Treaties of Rome. Although the preamble 
PDNHVJHQHUDOUHIHUHQFHVWR¶OLEHUW\·DQGDUWLFOHVWDWHVWKDWDQ\(XURSHDQQDWLRQ¶PD\
DSSO\ WR EHFRPH D PHPEHU RI WKH &RPPXQLW\· this does not in any way make 
democracy a prerequisite for membership or even mention it as one of the fundamental 
YDOXHVXQGHUSLQQLQJWKHPRYHPHQWWRZDUGV¶FORVHUXQLRQ·12 In fact, Daniel Thomas has 
claimed that the omission of democracy and human rights from the Treaties was a 
GHOLEHUDWH VKLIW DZD\ IURP WKH ¶FRQVWLWXWLRQDOLVDWLRQ RI GHPRFUDF\ DQG KXPDQ ULJKWV·
previously found, for instance, in the 1948 Brussels Treaty or the 1949 Statute of the 
                                                                                                                                                              
enlargement WKURXJKWKH(3OHQVLQ6XVDQQDK9HUQH\¶&UHDWLQJWKHGHPRFUDWLFWUDGLWLRQRI(XURSHDQ
,QWHJUDWLRQWKH6RXWK(XURSHDQFDWDO\VW·LQHelen, Sjursen, ed., Enlargement and the Finality of the EU, 
ARENA Report No7/2002, 97-128. 
10 7KRPDV'LH]¶6SHDNLQJ(XURSHWKHSROLWLFVRILQWHJUDWLRQGLVFRXUVH·Journal of European Public Policy, 6, 4 
(1999), 598-613. 
11 6HHDOVR+HOHQH6MXUVHQ¶:K\([SDQG"7KH4XHVWLRQRI/HJLWLPDF\DQG-XVWLILFDWLRQLQWKH(8·V
(QODUJHPHQW3ROLF\·Journal of Common Market Studies, 40, 3 (2002), 491-513 and Helene Sjursen, ed., 
Enlargement in Perspective (Oslo: Arena3DXO0DJQHWWHDQG.DO\SVR1LFRODLGLV¶7KH(XURSHDQ
8QLRQ
V'HPRFUDWLF$JHQGD·LQ0DULR, Telò, ed., The EU and Global Governance, (London/New York: 
Routledge, 2009), 43-63. 
12 Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, 25 March 1957. Gerard Quinn explains how 
¶WKLVIL[DWLRQRQHFRQRPLFPHDQVDQGWKHOHJDOWRROVQHHGHGWRHIIHFWXDWHWKHPUDWKHUWKDQRQJUDQG
political ends allowed those who held diametrically opposed visions of the ultimate ends of European 
integration to sign up together to the technocratic procesVRIHFRQRPLFLQWHJUDWLRQ·LQ*HUDUG4XLQQ¶7KH
(XURSHDQ8QLRQDQGWKH&RXQFLORI(XURSHRQWKH,VVXHRI+XPDQULJKWV7ZLQVVHSDUDWHGDWELUWK· 
McGill Law Journal 46(2001), 860. 
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Council of Europe.13 Rather than being an original tenet of the European construction, 
democracy was slowly introduced and built into the core political value of European 
identity over more than two decades. 
The initial impetus for what would become the CommXQLW\·V SROLWLFDO LGHQWLW\
GLVFRXUVHFDPH LQZLWK WKH(XURSHDQ3DUOLDPHQW·V UHVSRQVH WR6SDLQ·V LQFUHDVLQJ
overtures towards the Community and open interest in associating itself with the EC 
with a view to becoming a member. In fact, when the UK first applied the previous year, 
nobody would have thought to question its democratic credentials, any other objections 
notwithstanding. Spain, on the other hand, was still in the grips of the Francoist regime 
and was not even a member of the Council of Europe. The possibility of an application 
led German MEP Willy Birkelbach, a member of the socialist group, to draft a Report on 
the political and institutional aspects of accession (adhésion) or association with the 
Community.14 Based on the work undertaken by the Political Affairs Committee between 
November and December 1961, the now well-known Birkelbach Report formed the 
basis of the first general debate on the principles of enlargement held by the European 
Parliament.  
The report put forward an interpretation of the Treaty of Rome according to 
which states wishing to join would have to fulfill certain conditions, and affirmed the 
(3·V LQWHQWLRQ WR HQJDJH LQ WKH GHILQLWLRQ RI WKH SROLWLFDO DQG LQVWLWXWLRQDO DVSHFWV RI
accession in general terms: the stated aim was not to pass judgment on the specificities 
on any particular membership application, but to establish the general principles under 
which an accession should take place. In addressing the political conditions for eligibility, 
the report asserted that the political regime of an applicant state should ensure that the 
QHZVWDWHZRXOGQRWEHD¶FRUSVpWUDQJHU·DPRQJWKHH[LVWLQJVWDWHVZKLFKWKHGRFXPHQW
                                                        
13 7KRPDV'&¶&RQVLWXWLRQDOL]DWLRQWKURXJK(QODUJHPHQWWKHFRQWHVWHGRULJLQVRIWKH(8·6GHPRFUDWLF
LGHQWLW\·Journal of European Public Policy, 13,8 (2006), 1190-1210. The absence of human rights and 
democracy in thH7UHDWLHVRI5RPHLVGLVFXVVHGLQ0DUWLQ&RQZD\DQG9RONHU'HSNDW¶7RZDUGVD
European History of the Discourse of Democracy - Discussing Democracy in Western Europe 1945-·
and 7RP%XFKDQDQ¶+XPDQ5LJKWV7KH0HPRU\RI:DUDQGWKH0DNLQJVRIWKH¶(XURSHDQ·,GHQWLW\
1945-·ERWKLQMartin, Conway and Kiran Klaus Patel, eds., Europeanisation in the Twentieth Century: 
Historical Approaches %DLVQJVWRNH3DOJUDYH0DFPLOODQ.DL+DEHODQG7RELDV/HQ]¶7KH
identity/policy nexus in European Foreign 3ROLF\·Journal of European Public Policy, (2015) DOI: 
10.1080/13501763.2015.1047398 (last visited 19 October 2015). 
14 Willi Birkelbach, Report on behalf of the Political Affairs Committee on the political and institutional 
aspects of accession or association to the Community, 15 Jan 1962, European Parliamentary Assembly 
(hereafter EPA), Documents de Séance, Doc. 122; Rapporteur Willi Birkelbach was a member of the 
German SPD and hence of the Socialist Group within the EP. Throughout the article, any time reference 
WRDPHPEHURIWKH(3VSHDNLQJWRWKHDVVHPEO\LVPDGHIRUWKHILUVWWLPHWKHVSHDNHU·VQDWLRQDODQG
political affiliation will be indicated, as well as the title of the debate and the date. 
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H[SODLQHGDVWKH¶JXDUDQWHHRIWKHH[LVWHQFHRIDIRUPRIGHPRFUDWLFVWDWH· as a condition 
for accession.15 
 It defined this democratic state as a state in which governments enjoy 
democratic legitimation and the people take part in decision-making either directly or 
through directly elected representatives.16 It also stated that applicant states should be 
required to recognise the principles indicated by the Council of Europe as a condition 
for membership, especially the rule of law, human rights and fundamental freedoms (art. 
3 of the Statute of the Council of Europe).17 In presenting the report to the EP, 
BirkeOEDFK DIILUPHG WKH GHVLUH WR HVWDEOLVK JXLGHOLQHV ¶OLJQHVGLUHFWULFHV· IRU DFFHVVLRQ
and association. He highlighted the fact that democracy, in the form of the respect of 
fundamental rights and freedoms, was to be considered an essential requirement for 
Community membership.18 The same ideas were expressed by his colleagues in the 
ensuing parliamentary debate.19 In January 1962, the EP was a largely symbolic institution 
and would have had no formal role in any enlargement process. Its members, however, 
were seeking ways to carve out a role for their institution within the framework of the 
European Community. The prospect of a membership request from a country that was 
under dictatorial rule and did not share any of the democratic make-XS RI WKH (&·V
existing member states proved the ideal opportunity for the EP to both define the EC as 
a political actor and to highlight the concept of democracy as its fundamental value. The 
debate surrounding the Birkelbach report, albeit hypothetical at this stage, was thus 
significant for introducing three concepts: that the EC had a political identity; that this 
identity was based on the democratic principle, as respected by its existing member 
states; and that any state wishing to join should adhere to the same principle in order to 
be eligible.  Over the following two decades, these ideas would be honed by the 
                                                        
15 Idem. 
16 EPA, 15 January 1962, Birkelbach Report, 4. 
17 EPA, 15 January 1962, %LUNHOEDFK5HSRUWIRUPRUHRQWKH&RXQFLORI(XURSH·VKXPDQULJKWVSROLF\
VHH3DPHOD$-RUGDQ¶'RHVPHPEHUVKLSKDYHLWVSULYLOHJHV"(QWUDQFHLQWRWKH&RXQFLORI(XURSHDQG
FRPSOLDQFHZLWKKXPDQULJKWVQRUPV·Human Rights Quarterly, 25, 3 (2003), 660-688; Jonathan L. Black-
%UDQFK¶2EVHUYLQJDQGHQIRUFLQJKXPDQULJKWVXQGHUWKH&RXQFLORI(XURSHWKHFUHDWLRQRIDSHUPDQHQW
(XURSHDQ&RXUWRI+XPDQ5LJKWV·The Buffalo Journal of International Law, 3, 1 (1996), 1-33. 
18 Willi Birkelbach, Socialist, Germany, EPA, 'pEDWV$VSHFWVSROLWLTXHVHWLQVWLWXWLRQQHOVGHO·DGKpVLRQRX
GHO·DVVRFLDWLRQj la Communauté, 23 January 1962.  
19 See for instance Jean Pierre Duvieusart, Christian Democrat, Belgium, EPA, Débats, Aspects politiques 
et LQVWLWXWLRQQHOVGHO·DGKpVLRQRXGHO·DVVRFLDWLRQjOD&RPPXQDXWp-DQXDU\DQG)HUQDQG
Dehousse, Socialist, Belgium, EPA, 'pEDWV$VSHFWVSROLWLTXHVHWLQVWLWXWLRQQHOVGHO·DGKpVLRQRXGH
O·DVVRFLDWLRQjOD&RPPXQDXWp-DQXDU\ 
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European Parliament and, increasingly, the Commission and the Council, as they defined 
the terms of the expansion of the EC to new member states.  
A scant month aftHU WKH (3·V DSSURYDO RI WKH %LUNHOEDFK UHSRUW LQ )HEUXDU\
1962, the Spanish government made a formal request for talks,20 with the clear intention 
of negotiating association and eventual integration into the Community.21 %LUNHOEDFK·V
reaction was immediate. On behalf of the socialist group in the EP, he posed the first 
oral question to the Council ever asked by a representative of the parliament: he asked 
whether the Council and the Commission would find it appropriate to consider such an 
application, coming IURP D FRXQWU\ ZKRVH ¶SROLWLFDO SKLORVRSK\· ZDV LQ FRPSOHWH
RSSRVLWLRQWRWKH¶FRQFHSWLRQVDQGVWUXFWXUHV·RIWKH(&+HWKHQTXRWHGWKHUHIHUHQFH
WR ¶IUHHGRP· LQ WKH 3UHDPEOH RI WKH 5RPH 7UHDWLHV DQG OLQNHG LW GLUHFWO\ ZLWK KXPDQ
rights and fundamental democratic liberties, giving an interpretation based on the values 
shared by the Six and that it would be hard for them to reject. He was explicitly 
espousing the interpretation of these words that had already been given by trade unions 
across the Six, who HPSKDVLVHG WKH ¶FDUDFWqUH QRQ-GpPRFUDWLTXH· RI WKH 6SDQLVK
JRYHUQPHQWDV¶HQFRQWUDGLFWLRQDYHFOHVSULQFLSHVIRQGDPHQWDX[GHOD&RPPXQDXWp·22   
The EP directly questioned the position of the Commission and the Council on 
the place of democracy within the EC ² and both were left wrong-footed by this move.  
7KH &RXQFLO·V ZULWWHQ UHSO\ VLPSO\ VWDWHG WKDW LW ZDV IRU WKH WLPH EHLQJ XQDEOH WR
provide an answer. Commissioner Jean Rey, responsible for external relations and thus a 
key actor in the multiple applications, provided a rather vague reply during the debate of 
29 March: while stating that the preoccupations of Parliament were important and that 
the Commission had debated the Birkelbach report with interest, and that the 
&RPPLVVLRQ DLPHG WRGHYLVH VRPH ¶JHQHUDO SULQFLSOHV· RQ DVVRFLDWLRQ DQG HQODUJHPHQW
WKDWZRXOGHQMR\3DUOLDPHQW·VFRQVHQWKHZRXOGQRWJRDQ\IXUWKHULQKLVDVVHVVPHQWRI
6SDLQ·V SROLWLFDO HOLJLELOLW\.23 At the same time, EC member states were also grappling 
                                                        
20 Charles PRZHOO·7KHORQJURDGWR(XURSH Spain and the European Community, 1957-86·LQ-XOLR
Baquero Cruz, and Carlos Closa, eds., European integration from Rome to Berlin, (Brussels: P.I.E. Peter Lang, 
2009), 39-64. 
21 'DQLHO7KRPDV¶&RQVWLWXWLRQDOLVDWLRQ7KURXJK(QODUJHPHQWWKHFRQWHVWHGRULJLQVRIWKH(8·V
GHPRFUDWLFLGHQWLW\·Journal of European Public Policy, 13, 8 (2006), 1190-1210. 
22 :LOOL%LUNHOEDFK6RFLDOLVW*HUPDQ\(3$'pEDWV4XHVWLRQRUDOHVXUO·RXYHUWXUHGHQpJRFLDWLRQVDYHF
O·(VSDJQH0DUFK1962; 9LFWRU)HUQiQGH]6RULDQR¶/D&((IDFHjO
(VSDJQHIUDQTXLVWH·9LQJWLqPH
Siècle. Revue d'histoire, 108 (2010), 85- 98. 
23 Jean Rey, Commission, EPA, 'pEDWV4XHVWLRQRUDOHVXUO·RXYHUWXUHGHQpJRFLDWLRQVDYHFO·(VSDJQH
March 1962. Belgian Liberal Jean Rey was responsible for external relations in the Hallstein Commission, 
and President of the European Commission between July 1967 and July 1970. 
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with the request: while Germany and France seemed more open to the possibility, the 
UHDFWLRQRIWKH%HQHOX[FRXQWULHVZDVDPRUH¶IURVW\·RQH24 6SDLQ·VUHTXHVWGLGLQGHHG
raise some fundamental political questions about the identity of the Community and its 
values.25 Such concerns were not limited to Community actors and the governments of 
the member states, but were also considered pressing by trade unions and transnational 
political movements.26 In fact, the EP served as the main conduit into the European 
&RPPXQLW\·VLQVWLWXWLRQDOV\Vtem of concerns that existed quite widely within European 
society, but may likely have been ignored by both the Council and the European 
Commission, in which the political left amongst which such sentiments were most acute, 
was much less well represented than in the parliament. Eventually, this first Spanish 
attempt came to naught, but the ripples caused by this initial debate on political values 
continued to reverberate.   
 
*UHHFH·VFRXSDQGWKHUHDIILUPDWLRQRIWKH(&·VGHPRFUDWLFSULQFLSOH 
The debate on the role of democracy within the political identity of the 
&RPPXQLW\FDPHEDFNWRWKHIRUHLQZKHQWKH&RORQHOV·FRXSLQ*UHHFHJDYHULVH
to a new problem: how was the Community to react to such a crisis in the first 
European state to have signed an Association agreement with the EEC?27 The 1961 
Athens Association agreement was uniquely privileged in comparison with later 
agreements in that it had been specifically designed to lead to full membership.28 
According to Hans-August Lücker ¶*UHHFH·V DSSlication for association in 1962 was 
greeted with enthusiasm in Europe, especially by Walter Hallstein. The first President of 
the Commission reveled in the idea that the country that was the cradle of European 
democracy, the Greek spirit that had made Europe great, wanted to come and be a 
                                                        
24 %LUJLW$VFKPDQQ¶7KHUHOLDEOH$OO\*HUPDQ\6XSSRUWV6SDLQ·V(XURSHDQ,QWHJUDWLRQ(IIRUWV-·
Journal of European Integration History, 7,1 (2001), 40. 
25 Ibid.  
26 Thomas, op. cit. See also Pilar Ortuño Anaya, European Socialists and Spain. The Transition to Democracy 
1959-1977 1HZ<RUN3DOJUDYH7RP%XFKDQDQ¶+XPDQ5LJKWV&DPSDLJQVLQ0RGHUQ%ULWDLQ·LQ
Nick Crowson, Matthew Hilton and James McKay, eds., 1*2·VLQ&RQWHPSRUDU\%ULWDLQ1RQ-State Actors in 
Society and Politics since 1945 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), 117. 
27 There is a plethora of studies investigating the American and British role during the Greek dictatorship; 
please see: James Edward Miller, The United States and the Making of Modern Greece. History and Power, 1950-
1974 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2009), 157-6; Robert Keely, 7KH&RORQHO·s Coup 
DQGWKH$PHULFDQ(PEDVV\$'LSORPDW·V9LHZRIWKH%UHDNGRZQRI'HPRFUDF\LQ&ROG:DU*UHHFH(Pennsylvania: 
The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2010), 83-(IILH3HGDOLX¶´$'LVFRUGDQW1RWHµ1$72DQG
the Greek Junta, 1967-·Diplomacy & Statecraft, 22,1 (2011), 101-120. 
28 George Yannopoulos, Greece and the EEC: The First Decade of a Troubled Association (Beverly Hills: Sage 
Publications, 1975). 
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PHPEHU·29 
A military coup in Greece, the first associate member and the perceived cradle 
RIGHPRFUDF\UHNLQGOHGWKHGHEDWHRQWKH&RPPXQLW\·VVWDQFHRQLVVXHVRIGHPRFUDF\
On 8 May 1967, Edoardo Martino, chairman of the (3·V3ROLWLFDO$IIDLUV&RPPLWWHH
DGGUHVVHGDQRUDOTXHVWLRQWRWKH&RXQFLOH[SUHVVLQJWKHFRPPLWWHH·VDQ[LHW\DERXWWKH
suspension of civil and political rights in Greece and its incompatibility with the 
principles at the basis of the Community, which also formed the basis of the 
Association agreement. He also affirmed that Parliament considered itself the 
¶GHPRFUDWLF JXDUDQWRU· RI IUHHGRP LQ (XURSH DQG WKDW LW ZRXOG GR HYHU\WKLQJ LQ LWV
power to facilitate the return of democratic legality in Greece.30 In the ensuing debate, 
Dutch Christian Democrat Wilhelmus Schuijt explicitly asked for the freezing of the 
association agreement with Greece until parliamentary democracy was restored.31 He 
justified this request by referring to the political nature of the Association agreement 
with Greece, claiming that the joint parliamentary commission between the European 
Parliament and the Greek Parliament represented the embodiment of this political 
relationship. Based on this understanding of the Association agreement as a political 
one, Schuijt argued that the suspension of the powers of the Greek parliament by the 
military regime and the consequent suspension of the joint commission denied the 
nature of the agreement: depriving the Greek parliament of its crucial role as the 
UHSUHVHQWDWLYH RI WKH SHRSOH DOVR GHSULYHG WKH $VVRFLDWLRQ DJUHHPHQW RI LWV ¶PRVW
LPSRUWDQW SROLWLFDO HOHPHQW·32 Fellow speakers from the Socialist and Liberal groups 
echoed these sentiments.33 :KLOH LQ  6SDLQ·V SRWHQWLDO DFFHVVLRQ ZDV RQO\ D
                                                        
29 Interview with Hans-August Lücker: the Association Agreement between Greece and the EEC (Bonn, 
May 2006) (last visited on 19 October 2015) 
http://www.cvce.eu/en/obj/interview_with_hans_august_lucker_the_association_agreement_between_gr
eece_and_the_eec_bonn_15_may_2006-en-c0a40276-36e3-4263-ad73-888578b88254.html 
30 Edoardo Martino, Christian Democrat, Italy, EPA, Débats, Question orale n. 4/67 avec débat relative a 
l'association CEE-Grèce, 8 May 1967. Martino, a former partisan and a member of the European 
Parliament since 1958, was Chair of the Political Committee between 1964 and 1967, and would then be 
Commission for external affairs in the Rey Commission.  
31 Wilhelmus Schuijt, Christian Democrat, Netherlands, EPA, Débats, Question orale n. 4/67 avec débat 
relative a l'association CEE-Gréce, 8 May 1967.  Schujit was president of the Committee of Association 
with Greece.  
32 EPA, Débats, Question orale n. 4/67 avec débat relative a l'association CEE-Grèce, 8 May 1967. 
33 Walter Faller was a German member of the Socialist group. Cornelis Berkhouver was a Dutch member 
of the European Parliament from 1964 to 1984. A member of the Dutch Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en 
'HPRFUDWLH3HRSOH·V3DUW\IRU)UHHGRPDQG'HPRFUDF\KHZDVFKDLURIWKH/LEHUDODQG'HPRFUDWLF
group from February 1970 to march 1973 and President of the EP between March 1973 and March 1975; 
Cornelis Berkhouwer, Liberal and Democratic Group, Netherlands, EPA,  Débats. Question orale n. 4/67 
avec débat relative à l'association CEE- Grèce, 8 May 1967. 
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hypothetical possibility, the EC-Greece Association agreement established clear 
institutional and legal links, which the dictatorial regime now threatened. It also was a 
clear precursor to full membership for Greece, and the EP asking for the Agreement to 
be suspended showed once again the cross-party consensus on the idea of democracy as 
a condition for membership. 34 
 Initially, the Commission and the Council both gave cautious responses 
to the European 3DUOLDPHQW·V SUHVVXUHV 7KH GLIIHUHQFHV OLNHO\ UHIOHFWHd the diverse 
nature of the three institutions involved ² as the EP took an immediate and clear stance 
against the regime in public, behind closed doors the debates in the Commission and 
Council showed the warring opinions and concerns harboured by the member states. 
There was immense pressure within the circles of the Commission, as many worried 
that a failure to take a clear stance on the question would be interpreted as support for 
the new regime.35 Meanwhile, on 5 June 1967, the Council could not even reach a 
consensus on issuing a declaration on the establishment of the Greek dictatorship, 
deciding that a prudent stance of wait and see was the most suitable course of action. 
+RZHYHU)UDQFHDQG:HVW*HUPDQ\RSSRVHGDQ\RSHQFRQGHPQDWLRQRIWKH&RORQHOV·
regime. They underlined the strategic importance of Greece for NATO following the 
Soviet penetration in the Mediterranean ² thus highlighting the wider geopolitical 
repercussions on the Cold War chessboard.36  
 In the case of the Greek junta, the Council had manifested the innate 
FRQWUDGLFWLRQZKLFK FKDUDFWHUL]HG WKH(&·VGHDOLQJVZLWK WKLUGSDUWLHV LWV UKHWRULFRQ
human rights and democratization was repeatedly undermined by the strategic and 
economic interests of its member states, thereby providing the Greek regime some ² 
albeit limited ² room for maneuver.37 In their authoritative works on French and 
German policies towards the Greek dictatorship, Plassmann and Pelt respectively have 
                                                        
34 5pVROXWLRQVXUO·DVVRFLDWLRQHQWUHOD&((HWOD*UqFHEPA, Débats, 11 May 1967, Association C.E.E.- 
Gréce. The resolution was approved by all party groups. 
35Note for Jean Rey, Brussels, 30 May 1967, Historical Archives of the European Union, Florence, 
Edoardo Martino Files (hereafter EM) 76. 
36 Minutes of Council of Ministers, Brussels, 5 June 1967, EM 77; Study on the Strategic Situation in the 
Mediterranean due to Increased Presence of Soviet Fleet, Athens, 13-February-1968, Historical Archive of 
Greek Foreign Ministry [hereafter HAFGM], Athens, London Embassy Series, 1968, N2324-45; 
KonstDQWLQD0DUDJNRX¶)DYRXULWLVPLQ1$72·V6RXWK-eastern flank: The case of the Greek Colonels, 
1967-·Cold War History, 9,3 (2009), 347-366; Miller, The United States, 157-61. 
37 Meeting between Stavros Roussos and Jean Rey, Brussels, 7 November 1968, EM 79; Barbara Keys, 
¶$QWL-Torture politics: Amnesty International, the Greek Junta, and the Origins of the US Human Rights 
%RRP·LQAkira, Iriye, Petra, Goedde and William Hitchcock, eds., The Human Rights Revolution: An 
International History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 201-223. 
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documented the close relationships that both countries maintained with the dictatorial 
regime, in supply of military equipment and financial assistance.38 There was no 
coordination of bilateral and multilateral relations towards Greece. At the same time as 
the EC was moving to freeze the association, France was furnishing the junta with arms 
LQLWVHIIRUWWRFUHDWHDWKLUGSROHLQWKH0HGLWHUUDQHDQZKLOH:HVW*HUPDQ\*UHHFH·V
VHFRQG ODUJHVW VXSSOLHU RI DUPV DQG WKH 86·V FORVHVW DOO\ YLV-à-vis Athens, adopted a 
very lenient policy.39  
While the Council grappled with these difficulties, new Commission President 
Jean Rey was pressed by German Socialist Ludwig Metzger to clarify the 
&RPPLVVLRQ·VSRVLWLRQGXULQJDSDUOLDPHQWDU\GHEDWH LQ6HSWHPEHU5H\VWDWHG
that the Community would maintain the daily management of the agreement but ² 
crucially ²  it would not negotiate on new issues (agricultural harmonisation and a new 
financial agreement) as originally envisaged,40 ¶XQWLO WKHGHPRFUDWLFDQGSDUOLDPHQWDU\
VWUXFWXUHV DUH UHVWRUHG LQ *UHHFH·41 7KH &RPPXQLW\·V ILQDQFLDO DLG ZDV DOso 
suspended. Only 69 of the 125 million dollars worth of credit made available to 
Greece under the first financial protocol had been used up.  
Thus, while the initial reactions to the Greek developments of the EP, 
Commission and Council were very different, the three did to some extent converge 
toward a similar stance on the issue. In fact, a Commission paper stated that three 
factors made it necessary to take a clear position: firstly, the worsening of the domestic 
situation in Greece; secondly, the totalitarian tendencies of the new regime; thirdly, the 
stances taken by the different European governments and the unequivocal position of 
WKH &RXQFLO·V FRQVXOWDWLYH DVVHPEO\ ZKLFK UHLQIRUFHG WKH WKHVLV SXW IRUZDUG E\ WKH
EP.42   
 The actual impact of the freezing of the Association agreement on the dictatorial 
regime remains an open question, although most studies so far have reached a negative 
                                                        
38 Lorenz Plassmann, Comme dans une nuit de Paques? Les relations franco-grecques, 1944-1981 (Peter Lang, 
Brussels, 2012); Mogens Pelt, Tying Greece to the West. US-West German-Greek Relations, 1949-1974 (Museum 
Tusculanum Press, Copenhagen, 2006). 
39 (IILH3HGDOLX´$6HDRI&RQIXVLRQ·7KH0HGLWerranean and Détente, 1969-·, Diplomatic History, 33, 
4 (2009), 735-750. 
40 See Jean Rey, EPA, Débats, 20 September 1967, Débat sur la déclaration de M. le President de la 
Commission des Communautés Européennes. 
41 Bulletin Europe Information on Greece and the European Community, Brussels, 14/78, 3 
42 Report for E. Martino, Brussels, 5 May 1968, EM 78. 
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verdict in term of concrete results.43 Nonetheless, its symbolic impact combined could 
not be ignored: even the dictators were troubled by the blow dealt by the EEC decision 
WR WKH UHJLPH·V OHJLWLPDF\ DQG WULHG WR OLIW WKH IUHH]H E\ WKUHDWHQLQJ WKH (XURSHDQ
Commission with legal action while, at the same time, trying to dispel perceptions that 
they were diplomatically isolated. In refusing to reconsider the suspension of the 
Association, the European Community was demonstrating that a lack of democracy was, 
and would be, the principal hurdle to any further integration.  This also contrasted with 
the position of the US and NATO, widely perceived to be indifferent or even tolerant of 
the new Greek regime.44 As Greece emerged from the dictatorship years later, this 
SHUFHLYHGFRQWUDVWZRXOGSOD\DQLPSRUWDQWUROHLQWKHWUDQVLWLRQVWUDWHJ\RIWKHFRXQWU\·V
political elite. A parallel response from the Council of Europe led the Greeks to 
withdraw before a vote could sanction their exclusion in 1969. Thus, in the eyes of the 
Greeks, the EC and the Council of Europe were the two organisations that had, at least 
symbolically, denounced the dictatorship - unlike the transatlantic allies.45 Similarly, 
taking this stance proved important for the EC itself: the debates and even disagreements 
LQWKH(3WKH&RPPLVVLRQDQGWKH&RXQFLORYHU*UHHFH·V$VVRFLDWLRQHQKDQFHGWKHLGHD
of the European Community as a community of values with both the right and the duty 
to uphold democracy within the European continent - no matter that this may have been 
an unintended consequence of discussions that had started before they could actually be 
thought to have concrete policy implications.  
 
The EC as the promoter and guarantor of ¶European democracy·  
In the 1970s, as the dictatorships of Greece, Spain and Portugal collapsed and 
the three countries set their sights on EC membership, the Community no longer merely 
intended democracy as a requirement prior to accession: in addition, it set itself up as a 
¶JXDUDQWRU RI GHPRFUDF\· ,Q WKH GLVFRXUVH RI WKH DSSOLFDQWV DQG LQ WKDW RI WKH (&
                                                        
43 9DQ&RXIRXGDNLV¶7KH(XURSHDQ(FRQRPLF&RPPXQLW\DQGWKH)UHH]LQJRIWKH$VVRFLDWLRQ·Journal of 
Common Market Studies, 16, 2 (1978), 114-131; C.M.Woodhouse, The Rise and Fall of the Greek Colonels 
(London: Granada, 1985). 
44 $OWKRXJKWKH1$72·VSUHDPEOHFRQWDLQVUHIHUHQFHVWRGHPRFUDF\RQHRILWVIRXQGLQJPHPEHUVZDV
under dictatorship, namely Portugal and military coups never resulted in pressures to end their 
authoritarian rule (Turkey, Greece); on NATO and Greek dictatorship please see (IILH*+3HGDOLX´$
'LVFRUGDQW1RWHµ: NATO and the Greek Junta, 1967-·Diplomacy and Statecraft, 22,1 (2011), 101-20; Effie 
*+3HGDOLX¶+XPDQ5LJKWVDQG)RUHLJQ3ROLF\:LOVRQDQGWKH*UHHN'LFWDWRUV-·Diplomacy 
and Statecraft, 18,1 (2007), 185-214 
45 The Council of Europe fights for democracy in Greece, 1967-1969, Andreas G. Papandreou Foundation, Athebs, 
Historical Series No.1; Dimitris Constas, ´7KH*UHHN&DVHµ%HIRUHWKH&RXQFLORI(XURSH²69, (Athens: 
Papazisis, 1976), 76, 87²96, [in Greek];  
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enlargement was identified as a way of anchoring the new Mediterranean democracies to 
democratic Western Europe.46 Many historical studies of the applicant states show that 
they themselves interpreted accession to the European Community as a confirmation of 
their successful transition to democracy and an official acceptance back into the fold of 
WKH¶WUXH·(XURSH47 Tsoukalis shows how there was a widespread consensus among the 
Spanish political elites, and indeed its population at large, on EC membership as a way of 
stabilising the volatile political situation48 while in Greece the pro-membership elite saw 
membership as a way to consolidate democracy and referred to the freezing of the 
$VVRFLDWLRQDJUHHPHQWDQGWKH(&·VGHQXQFLDWLRQRI*UHHFH·VPLOLWDU\UHJLPHWRVXSSRUW
this argument.49 0RUHRYHU WKH &RPPXQLW\·V IRFXV RQ GHPRFUDF\ stood in marked 
contrast with the attitude of NATO and the United States, who had not denounced the 
dictatorship in the same way.50 This strengthened the claim that by joining the 
Community, Greece would be joining a pole of democracy. De la Guardia also identifies 
Spanish motivations for entry with the consensus between Spanish political and social 
forces on the necessity of European integration to engineer the socio-economic 
modernisation and full democratisation of the country after the collapse of FrancR·V
dictatorship.51 This consensus was shared by Spanish public opinion, which was based on 
DQ LGHDOLVWLF DQG UDWKHU YDJXH XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI ¶(XURSH· FRXSOHG ZLWK WKH GHVLUH IRU
international recognition.52 Charles Powell also focused on the idea of democracy as an 
HVVHQWLDODVSHFWRI6SDLQ·VGHVLUHWRMRLQWKH(&53  
                                                        
46 Paul Preston & Denis Smyth, Spain, the EEC and NATO, Chatham House Papers 22 (Routledge: 
London, 1984), 66. 
47 Eirini Karamouzi, Greece, the EEC and the Cold War, 1974-1979. The Second Enlargement (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2014); Alice Cunha, O Alargamento Ibérico da Comunidade Económica Europeia: A 
Experiência Portuguesa, PhD Thesis, Universidade Nova de Lisboa, 2012; Nuno Severiano Texeira (ed.), The 
International Politics of Democratization. Comparative Perspectives (London and New York: Routledge, 2008); 
Special issue on transition: Maria Fernanda Rollo, Alice Cunha, Jean-Pierre Darnis HGV¶Democratic 
Transition, European Economic Community Accession and Southern Europe·Cahiers de la Méditerranée, 90 
(June 2015). 
48 Loukas Tsoukalis, The European Community and its Mediterranean enlargement, (London: Allen &Unwin, 
1981), 122. 
49 Tsoukalis, Ibid. 
50 Miller, The United States; .RQVWDQWLQD0DUDJNRX¶7KH:LOVRQ*RYHUQPHQW·V5HVSRQVHVWR¶7KH5DSHRI
*UHHN'HPRFUDF\··Journal of Contemporary History, 45,1 (2010), 162-180. 
51 'H/D*XDUGLD5¶,QVHDUFKRIORVW(XURSH6SDLQ·LQWolfram, Kaiser and Jürgen Elvert, eds., 
European Union Enlargement (London: Routledge, 2004), 93-11. 
52 Ibid. 
53 3RZHOO·7KHORQJURDGWR(XURSH·6HHDOVR0DWWKLHX7URXYp/·(VSDJQHHWO·(XURSH² De la dictature de 
)UDQFRjO·8QLRQHXURSpHQQH (Brussels: PIE ² Peter Lang, 2009); see also Mario Del Pero, Víctor Gavín, 
Fernando Guirao and Antonio Varsori, 'HPRFUD]LH/·(XURSDPHULGLRQDOHHODILQHGHOOHGLWWDWXUH, (Milano: Le 
Monnier, 2010). 
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Such a perception of the EC as a champion of democracy in the eyes of the 
applicants makes it all the more compelling to ask why this also became a crucial concept 
for the Community actors themselves. After all, the practical functioning of the EC was 
hardly a model of democratic practice: at the time of the Southern European 
applications, the European Parliament was not yet directly elected and talk of the 
democratic deficit was beginning to emerge. In 1973, the established democracies of the 
UK, Ireland and Denmark joined the EC without raising any questions with regards to 
democratic practice within Community discussions.54 Their accession did, of course, 
introduce new voices with strong national democratic traditions in the Community 
arena.55 However, the sense of crisis remained and led EC actors to seek a new raison 
G·HWUHIRUWKHSURMHFWRI(XURSHDQLQWHJUDWLRQ,WZDVLQWKLVFRQWH[WWKDWWKH\FRQYHUJHG
on the emerging self-image of the EC as a champion of democracy became a way of 
finding a QHZ UDLVRQ G·HWUH DW D WLPH RI FULVLV56 in the early 1970s, the international 
economic structures established after the Second World War were in crisis with the 
collapse of the Bretton Woods system and the repeated Oil crises, while the geopolitical 
order was also being called into question by the Vietnam War, the multiple crises in the 
Middle East and the changing dynamics of superpower relations linked to detente. With 
the US focused on these broader issues and deWHQWH OHG WR WKH ¶DPSOLI\LQJ DQG
DJJUDYDWLQJ >RI@ ORFDO DQG UHJLRQDO WHQVLRQV·57 the political developments in Southern 
Europe presented the EC with the need to address what was potentially a destabilising 
change on its immediate periphery. 
The geQHUDO VHQVH RI LQWHUQDWLRQDO FULVLV ZDV FRPSRXQGHG E\ WKH &RPPXQLW\·V
own sense of internal crisis, as initiatives such as EMU unravelled and disagreements 
persisted about the economic and even institutional shortcomings of the EC. A new 
catalyst was needed if the EC itself was to find a new common direction. Ongoing 
                                                        
54 The question of democracy at national level in the acceding countries, or indeed in Norway, which 
eventually rejected membership, is beyond the scope of this article. Neumann, Iver B. Norge , ¶This little 
piggy stayed at home. Why Norway is not a member of the EU·in Lene, Hansen and Ole Wæver, eds., 
European Integration and National Identity: The challenge of the Nordic States (London and New York: Routledge, 
2002), 88-103. 
55 )RULQVWDQFHVHHWKH8.&RQVHUYDWLYH0(3*HRIIUH\5LSSRQ·VFRQWULEXWLRQWRWKHGHEDWHRQ
Enlargement of the Community, 1 October 1977, on the relationship between democracy and security. See 
DOVR&DUROLQH-DFNVRQ¶7KH)LUVW%ULWLVK0(3V6W\OHVDQG6WUDWHJLHV·Contemporary European History, 2:2 
(1993), 169-195 
56 %R6WUDWK¶$(XURSHDQ,GHQWLW\WRWKHKLVWRULFDOOLPLWVRIWKHFRQFHSW·European Journal of Social Theory, 5 
(2002), 387-401. 
57 Mario Del Pero, The Eccentric Realist. Henry Kissinger and the making of American foreign policy (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 2009), 148. 
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discussions about the political nature of European integration and its democratic 
character presented an opportunity to find just such a rallying cry. At the same time, this 
internal quest took place as human rights emerged as a vital new element of the 
international political discourse, of which the Helsinki Act in 1975 was but one 
example.58 
 At the end of 1973, there had been an attempt to give European integration a 
more explicitly political dimension with the Document on European Identity: 
¶VKDULQJDVWKH\GRWKHVDPHDWWLWXGHVWROLIHEDVHGRQDGHWHUPLQDWLRQWREXLOGD
society which measures up to the needs of the individual, they are determined to 
defend the principles of representative democracy, of the rule of law, of social 
justice ³ which is the ultimate goal of economic progress ³ and of respect for 
KXPDQULJKWV$OORIWKHVHDUHIXQGDPHQWDOHOHPHQWVRIWKH(XURSHDQ,GHQWLW\·59  
 
 The Southern European applications for membership, and in particular the first, 
ORGJHG E\ *UHHFH LQ -XQH  SUHVHQWHG WKH LGHDO RSSRUWXQLW\ WR UHILQH WKH (&·V
identity beyond the rhetoric articulated in the previous decade, and the challenge of 
translating it into policy when faced with hard-edged economic and political 
considerations. 
 
The Greek Case: Converging Rhetoric 
7KH VXVSHQVLRQ RI WKH $VVRFLDWLRQ DJUHHPHQW WR WKH VWDWXV RI ¶FXUUHQW
DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ·DIWHU WKHFRXSFRXSOHGZLWK WKH IRUFHGZLWKGUDZDORI*UHHFH IURPWKH
Council of Europe in 1969 had contributed to the erosion of domestic approval for the 
junta and frustrated the attempts of the dictators to gain support from important 
European political elites.60 In Greek eyes, the Community became associated with liberal 
                                                        
58 Keys¶$QWL-Torture·-222; Samuel Moyn, The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 2010); Jan Eckel & Samuel Moyn, eds., The Breakthrough. Human Rights in the 
1970s (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2014) 
59 Declaration on European Identity, in Bulletin of the European Communities, December 1973, No 12. 
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,QH0HJHQV¶7KH'HFHPEHU
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'HFODUDWLRQRQ(XURSHDQ,GHQWLW\·LQJan van der Harst, ed., Beyond the Customs union: The European 
&RPPXQLW\·V4XHVWIRU'HHSHQLQJ:LGHQLQJDQG&RPSOHWLRQ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60 For a general account, see Woodhouse, The Rise and Fall, 98-130; Paulos Tsakaloyannis and Susannah 
9HUQH\¶/LQNDJH3ROLWLFV7KH5ROHRIWKH(XURSHDQ&RPPXQLW\LQ*UHHN3ROLWLFVLQ·Byzantine and 
Modern Greek Studies, 10 (1986), 179-94; For a detailed analysis of the EEC policy towards the Greek 
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democratic values, after the decLVLRQ WR IUHH]H WKH $VVRFLDWLRQ FUHDWHG  ¶DQ LQWHUHVWLQJ
phenomenon where the process of European integration was identified with the defence 
RIGHPRFUDWLFYDOXHV·61 7KLVKHOSHG*UHHFH·V OHDGHUGXULQJWKHWUDQVLWLRQ.RQVWDQWLQRV
Karamanlis, to use the EC OLQNWRSRVLWLYHO\LQIOXHQFH*UHHFH·VSROLWLFDOWUDMHFWRU\DQGLWV
international positioning by reintroducing Greece into the Western family of 
democracies.62  
The positive view of the EC was important when confronted with the strong anti-
Americanism that permeated Greek public opinion during and after the dictatorship, 
derived from the US failure, as perceived by the Greeks, to oppose the junta.63  This led 
Greek foreign minister George Mavros, in discussion with Helmut Schmidt, the German 
chancellor, to sigK GUDPDWLFDOO\ WKDW ¶HYHU\ *UHHN >LV@ FRQYLQFHG WKDW WKH *UHHN
GLFWDWRUVKLS ZDV VXSSRUWHG E\ WKH 86$·64 This sentiment reached its height with the 
double Turkish invasion of Cyprus and the perceived lack of reaction from the US and 
NATO, which led to GreecH·V ZLWKGUDZDO IURP WKH PLOLWDU\ ZLQJ RI WKH WUDQVDWODQWLF
DOOLDQFH .DUDPDQOLV ZRXOG ODWHU FRPPHQW WKDW ¶WKH ZLWKGUDZDO IURP 1$72 ZDV QRW
only justified but necessary. The fury of the Greek and Cypriot people was so great at 
that time that the only alternDWLYHZRXOGKDYHEHHQZDU·65  In this climate of volatile and 
heightened public sentiment, the Greek perception of the Community as the symbol of 
liberal democratic values presented a vital option to Greek policy-makers during 
transition - compounding the longstanding choice to move closer to the EC already 
made with the Association agreement in 1958.66  
7KH (&·V UHVSRQVH WR *UHHFH·V DSSOLFDWLRQ ZDV PL[HG LI QRW LQ SXEOLF WKHQ
certainly behind closed doors. The Commission and the member states were fully aware 
of the largely political reasons that had guided the Greek request; although positive in 
                                                        
61 (PDQXHO*D]]R·(QODUJHPHQWRIWKH&RPPXQLW\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their official response, they were much less enthusiastic in private, given the serious 
political and economic implications of a possible accession. The CommissioQ·V2SLQLRQ
published on 28 January 1976, understood fully the political importance of supporting 
the Greek application, but at the same time, it considered that enlargement called for 
speeding up the process of integration.67 The suggestion made of having a pre-accession 
period stemmed from several considerations.68 It presented an opportunity for the 
Community to reform its institutions and at the same time to develop a substantial 
programme for economic aid that would enable Greece to overcome its structural 
ZHDNQHVVHV DQG DGDSW PRUH HDVLO\ WR WKH &RPPXQLW\·V REOLJDWLRQV DQG PHFKDQLVPV
Moreover, a preparatory period seemed to reflect the desire of some member states to 
GHOD\*UHHFH·VDFFHVVLRQZLWKRXWFDXVLQJDSROLWLFDOUHEXII 
Despite the problems it hDGUDLVHGWKH&RPPLVVLRQ·V2SLQLRQFRQFOXGHGWKDW¶LWLV
FOHDUWKDWWKHFRQVROLGDWLRQRI*UHHFH·VGHPRFUDF\ZKLFKLVDIXQGDPHQWDOFRQFHUQQRW
only of the Greek people but also of the Community and its member states, is intimately 
related to the evolution RI*UHHFH·VUHODWLRQVKLSZLWKWKH&RPPXQLW\,WLVLQWKHOLJKWRI
these considerations that the Commission recommends that a clear affirmative reply be 
JLYHQ WR WKH*UHHN UHTXHVW·69 Therefore, notwithstanding serious misgivings about the 
challenges of a Greek accession, the Commission concluded that democratic concerns 
overshadowed all others when it came to providing a rationale in favour of accepting the 
*UHHN DSSOLFDWLRQ %RWK WKH &RPPLVVLRQ·V OXNHZDUP 2SLQLRQ DQG WKH DPELYDOHQW
responses of member staWHVDUHWHVWDPHQWWRWKH&RPPXQLW\·VDWWHPSWWRZDONWKHWKLQ
line between the need to welcome a recently democratised Greece and impact that its 
DFFHVVLRQ ZRXOG KDYH RQ WKH (&·V LQVWLWXWLRQDO DQG HFRQRPLF VWUXFWXUHV 7ZR ZHHNV
after it had been submitted, WKH&RXQFLOXQDQLPRXVO\UHMHFWHGWKH&RPPLVVLRQ·V2SLQLRQ
- an unprecedented and unexpected decision. At a press conference following the 
Council meeting, Gaston Thorn ² /X[HPERXUJ·VSULPHPLQLVWHUVSHDNLQJRQEHKDOIRI
the Council ² VWDWHG WKDW ¶IRU WKH nine delegations there could be no trial period or 
SROLWLFDO FRQVLGHUDWLRQV DWWDFKHG WR*UHHFH·V DFFHVVLRQ·70 Finally, after eight months of 
                                                        
67 Commission Working Document, HAEC, no.373, 28 January 1976. 
68 See Karamouzi, Greece, 1974-1979, 35-62.  
69 (XURSHDQ&RPPLVVLRQ¶(QODUJHPHQWRIWKH&RPPXQLW\&RQFOXVLRQ·Bulletin of the European Communities 
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GHOLEHUDWLRQV WKH &RPPXQLW\ KDG GHFLGHG WR RSHQ QHJRWLDWLRQV IRU *UHHFH·V SRWHQWLDO
membership. 
The promises that the Community had made to Greece when the Association 
agreement had been frozen and then when the dictatorship collapsed gave Karamanlis 
the opportunity to push for the argument that democratic obligations should trump 
economic concerns. In the face of this, the Community could do little else but be 
persuaded by the combined force of its own rhetoric and the Greek claims that only by 
being accepted into the EC fold would their transition succeed and avoid the potential 
destabilisation that a relapse into authoritarianism - or a detachment from the Western 
camp - would bring.71 
Underlying strategic imperatives laid at the root of the second enlargement: as the 
Southern European states emerged from the dictatorships and turned to the EC with the 
aim to become full members, the Community found itself in the position of having to 
respond to two interconnected problems. The first was to ensure that the transition to 
democracy remained on course; the second, that the international alignments on the Cold 
War game board remained at the very least unaltered by the regime changes.72 In 
formulating their response to these demands, the Community actors found that the                                             
principles voiced over the previous decade, and their reception by the applicants, would 
provide them with the ideal means to bring Greece, and then Spain and Portugal into the 
Western European institutional fold.  
 In order to meet these twin goals, the Community used the democratic norms it 
has been building up as its core political identity to justify enlargement through the 
rhetoric of democratic norms and values. In doing so, it could both reinforce its internal 
evolving self-perception and maintain the Southern European countries on the course of 
democracy and, crucially for the wider Cold War context, alignment with Western 
Europe through participation in its political and economic institutions at a time when 
NATO was unable to bind them together. 
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Democracy as the new binding principle of European integration 
*UHHFH·V DSSURDFK SURYHG DOO WKH PRUH VXFFHVVIXO EHFDXVH LW UHVRQDWHG ZLWK WKH
&RPPXQLW\·VSHUFHSWLRQRI LWVHOI DQGKRZ WKLVKDG HYROYHGGXULQJ WKH V ,QWHUQDO
talk focused not only oQ KRZ WR WDFNOH WKH &RPPXQLW\·V HFRQRPLF DQG LQVWLWXWLRQDO
SUREOHPV EXW DOVR RQ LWV IXWXUH WUDMHFWRU\ DQG RQ ¶GHILQLQJ (XURSH· 7KLV OHG WR WKH
attempt to give European integration a more explicitly political dimension with the 
December 1973 Document on European Identity73 followed in January 1976 by the 
7LQGHPDQV5HSRUWZKLFKDSSHDUHGMXVWDIHZGD\VEHIRUHWKH&RPPLVVLRQ·V2SLQLRQRQ
Greece. In this document Leo Tindemans, the Belgian prime minister, sought to compile 
an overview of the EEC with the aim of setting out a common concept of a European 
Union.74 +LV UHSRUW VWDWHG WKDW WKH &RPPXQLW\ ¶KDG ORVW LWV JXLGLQJ OLJKW QDPHO\ WKH
political consensus between our countries on our reasons for undertaking the joint 
WDVN·75 and the Community must find a new UDLVRQ G·rWUH LQ RUGHU WR SXVK (XURSHDQ
integration forward. What had once been the key appeal - the pursuit of economic 
interdependence - was no longer sufficient, and in any case the general economic crisis 
did not make it likely that the Community would be able to make any significant 
economic advance. The other driving motive behind the Treaties of Rome, namely the 
pursuit of peace and stability in Western Europe, was by the 1970s considered to have 
been attained. 
However, if these two forces had lost momentum, the advancement of 
¶democracy· could offer the Community a new way forward.76 Thus, enlargement 
SRWHQWLDOO\RIIHUHG WKHRSSRUWXQLW\ WR VKDSH WKH&RPPXQLW\·VSROLWLFDO GLPHQVLRQ77 In 
the words of Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the West German Foreign Minister, the decision 
WR ZHOFRPH WKH SRRU VRXWKHUQ FRXQWULHV VKRZHG WKDW ¶(XURSH KDG HPHUJHG IURP WKH
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VWDJHRIDQHFRQRPLFFRPPXQLW\WRGD\EHLQJDSROLWLFDOFRPPXQLW\·78 Such sentiments 
were echoed in the communiqués of the recently formed European Council, which 
identified the process of European integration with the defence of democratic values.79 
Thus the central legitimating strategy that had originally moved the project of 
European integration forward, that of promoting peace, found its complement in the 
CRPPXQLW\·VQHZREOLJDWLRQ WRSURPRWHGHPRFUDWLF LGHDOV80 7KXV*UHHFH·V UHTXHVW WR
enter the EC as a means of strengthening its own nascent democracy resonated with the 
&RPPXQLW\·VHIIRUWV WRSURPRWH LWVHOIDVDSURWHFWRURIGHPRFUDF\,QWKH*UHHNFDVH, 
the GLVFXVVLRQV RYHU HQODUJHPHQW DIIHFWHG WKH ((&·V VHOI-image while, in turn, this 
evolving self-image positively influenced the attitudes of the existing member states 
towards Greece. This created a sort of reciprocal relationship which meant that the 
manner in which the Nine responded to the Greek application would be the test-case for 
the &RPPXQLW\·V RZQ FUHGLELOLW\ LQ IRUPXODWLQJ D SROLF\ WKDW ZDV FRQVLVWHQW ZLWK LWV
newly self-SURFODLPHGLGHQWLW\7KH(&·VHPSKDVLVRQWKHLPSRUWDQFHRIGHPRFUDF\IRU
gaining membership essentially amounted to an explicit articulation of the fundamental 
characteristics of its new identity along with its new goals.  
7KHIDFWWKDW*UHHFHZDVZLGHO\SHUFHLYHGWREHWKHFXOWXUDO¶FUDGOHRIGHPRFUDF\·
only served to strengthen the process. The French President, for instance, eventually 
GHVFULEHG*UHHFH·VHQWU\DVD¶UHWXUQWRWKHURRWV·81 DQGZURWHLQKLVPHPRLUVWKDW¶LWZDV
LPSRVVLEOHWRH[FOXGH*UHHFHWKHPRWKHURIDOOGHPRFUDFLHVIURP(XURSH·82 Moreover, 
DFFHSWLQJ*UHHFH·V application made it all the more difficult for the EC to deny the same 
request from Spain and Portugal in 1977 provided they also continued along the path of 
democratization.  
The discussions of enlargement to the Southern European countries provided the 
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HVVHQWLDOFRQWH[WIRUWKH1LQH·VLGHDRIVXEVFULELQJWRDDeclaration on Democracy in 1978. 
As all three southern Mediterranean applicants claimed that joining the Community 
would help them to consolidate their nascent democracies, the time seemed ripe for a 
declaration on the fundamental principles on which the Community was based. In 
addition, the decision to hold the first direct elections to the European Parliament in 
 KHLJKWHQHG WKH QHHG WR ILQG D ZD\ WR ¶HVWDEOLVK D OLQN EHWZHHQ WKH SUDFWLFH RI
plXUDOLVWLF SDUOLDPHQWDU\ GHPRFUDF\ DQG PHPEHUVKLS RI WKH &RPPXQLW\·.83The 
declaration was to clearly commit the Community to democratic principles, which could 
then be reflected in the Acts of Accession of each new member state. However, the 
meeting of the European Council of December 1977 rejected the idea of incorporating 
such a declaration in the preamble of the eventual accession treaties,84 concluding instead 
that the Declaration would be sufficient, as it would form part of the acquis to which 
acceding states would have to subscribe.85 What mattered the most was to find the right 
moment to implement it without raising suspicions.86 
 The European Council of 7²8 April 1978 adopted the Declaration on Democracy, at 
the same time as the announcement of the date for the first direct elections of the 
European Parliament. The text of the declaration drew heavily on the 1973 Declaration on 
the European Identity DQGLWDOVRLQFOXGHGUHIHUHQFHVWRWKH&RPPXQLW\·VJoint Declaration on 
Fundamental Rights adopted under the UK Presidency on 5 April 1977. Its most crucial 
innovation was to include DILQDOSDUDJUDSKGHFODULQJ¶WKDWUHVSHFWIRUDQGPDLQWHQDQFH
of representative democracy and human rights in each member state are indispensable 
for membership of the European ComPXQLWLHV·87 Ultimately, the Nine were not 
particularly interested in giving more specific definitions of democracy. Indeed, steering 
clear of a more specific definition allowed them to muster convergence on the principle 
without having to address the question of how much and how far this idea of democracy 
would be realized in practice. As democratic practice varied considerably amongst the 
Nine, attempts of agree a clear set of democratic norms may arise strongly divergent 
opinions and lead to disagreement.  
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 Roy Jenkins, the then Commission President, commented on WKHGHFODUDWLRQ ¶D
directly elected European Parliament will introduce a major new democratic dimension 
to the institutions of the Community. And for this reason, it was entirely appropriate that 
we should also adapt at this European Council a declaration on democracy, for our 
V\VWHP RI SOXUDOLVW SDUOLDPHQWDU\ GHPRFUDF\ OLHV DW WKH YHU\ EDVLV RI WKH &RPPXQLW\·V
H[LVWHQFH·88 The Commission was very pleased with this development, seeing it as part of 
a bigger plan that would allow enlargement to take place without diluting the 
Community. Specifically, when Jenkins spoke about the emerging European Monetary 
System (EMS), direct European Parliament elections and enlargement, he revealed that 
these threHGHYHORSPHQWVZHUHSRZHUIXOO\LQWHUUHODWHG¶ZHFRXOGQRWHQYLVDJHPRQHWDU\
union without a European direct democracy. What better way of underwriting 
democracy in the three applicant countries than by inviting them to a new shared 
parliament? What better way of assuring that enlargement does not dilute the integration 
RI(XURSHWKDQE\UHVXPLQJWKHPRYHWRZDUGV(08"·89  
The declaration on democracy was thus an effective way of formally tying the ideas 
that had been developed over the previous two decades with the process of enlargement 
to Southern Europe: it formally set democratic principles as the basis for a shared 
political identity, which the new members would have to accept as part of the acquis.  
Conclusion 
 
7KH HYROXWLRQ RI WKH (&·V GHPRFUDWLF WUDGLtion was hardly linear, and it would be 
inaccurate to suggest that the course followed ² uneven as it was ² would inescapably 
lead to the formal constitutionalisation of democratic values in the 1993 Copenhagen 
criteria. Nonetheless, it is possible to identify how the different institutions of the 
Community developed a discourse of political identity in the 1960s and 1970s, 
introducing the idea of the Community as a political entity based on shared values, and 
then articulating these values around the concept of democracy in a way that became 
significant not merely in purely rhetorical terms, as a means of self-identification, but also 
as a framework within which policies had to be formulated. The prospect of enlargement 
served as a catalyst for the identifiFDWLRQ RI WKH &RPPXQLW\·V PLVVLRQ DQG JRDOV $V
Spain, Greece and Portugal underwent momentous political change, their leaders turned 
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expectant eyes to the EC, clearly demanding a political response. This, in turn, called for 
a definition of the shared political values binding the Community together. As part of 
this search, different actors within the EC came to identify democracy as a fundamental 
requirement for membership of the Community ² starting with MEPs, who managed to 
turn the existence of their at the time near-powerless institution into a symbol of the 
&RPPXQLW\·V FRPPLWPHQW WRGHPRFUDF\2QFH WKH LGHDKDGEHHQ LQWURGXFHG LQWR WKH
public discourse, it became very difficult for the Council and the Commission to not 
engage with it on some level, in the same way that they had to contend with realpolitik 
considerations when formulating their approach to their relations with the Southern 
European countries throughout the period.  
 Through subsequent re-interpretations of the Treaties of Rome, and in particular 
LWV 3UHDPEOH DGKHUHQFH WR GHPRFUDWLF SULQFLSOHV LQ D FRXQWU\·V JRYHUQLQJ LQVWLWXWLRQV
was first introduced as a requirement for any country seeking Community membership, 
as a means to preserve the allegiance to the fundamental political values shared by all 
member states. Once this criterion had been established ² even if not formally enshrined 
in law ² a further articulation of the relationship between EC membership and 
GHPRFUDF\DGGHGDGGLWLRQDOPHDQLQJWRWKH(&·VFRPPLWPHQWWRGHPRFUDWLFYDOXHV, by 
bestowing upon the Community the role of guarantor for the democratic commitment 
and practice of its member states ² thus providing an anchor for the democratic 
transitions of Greece, Spain and Portugal away from dictatorship. Finally, the 1978 
Declaration on Democracy made the commitment to democratic values part of the acquis.  
It may thus appear as a paradox that, as MEPs, Commissioners and even Council 
VSRNHVPDQDQGWKHVHLQVWLWXWLRQV·RIILFLDOGRFXPHQWVHOHYDWHGGHPRFUDF\WRWKHKLJKHVW
political value of their shared identity, all of them refrained from actually providing a 
definition of what democracy actually entailed. The term was ubiquitous but vague, and 
even the 1978 declaration on this very subject stopped short of specificity. By analysing 
the way in which democracy was spoken about, one can see that it was used in general 
DQGLQWHUFKDQJHDEO\DVSDUWRID¶WULSW\FK·DORQJVLGHWKHSURWHFWLRQDQGUHVSHFWRIKXPDQ
rights and the rule of law.90 However, no definition was ever provided beyond this. 
Nonetheless, rather than as a paradox, this may also be understood as a general desire to 
converge on a broad common principle in a group composed of states whose specific 
                                                        
90 .DO\SVR1LFRODLGLVDQG5DFKHO.OHLQIHOG¶5HWKLQNLQJ(XURSH·V5XOHRI/DZDQG(QODUJHPHQW$JHQGD
7KH)XQGDPHQWDO'LOHPPD·Jean Monnet Working Paper 12:12, 2012, 1-93. 
24 
 
historical and political traditions of democratic practice were often rather different from 
one another. A general political commitment to democracy as a fundamental value 
avoided any clashes that may have come from attempts to define what such adherence 
would look like in practice, while still providing a sense of belonging to a shared political 
community. 
The 1980s would see the EC focus on other issues ² even in the context of 
enlargement, once the political principles of the basis of which the applicants were to be 
accepted were established, attention would turn to practical matters. The Single 
European Act was dedicated to institutional reform and moving forward towards a 
FRPPRQPDUNHW<HWWKHLGHDRIGHPRFUDF\UHPDLQHGDWWKHKHDUWRIWKH(&·VLGHQWLW\
and by the end of the decade the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the unravelling of the 
Cold War framework brought it back into the limelight in full force. As countries in 
Central and Eastern Europe also started on the path to transition towards democracy, 
WKHLU GHPDQGV IRU WKH &RPPXQLW\·V VXSSRUW KDG PXFK WR GR ZLWK WKH VHHGV WKDW had 
been sown in the 1960s and 1970s. 
 
  
  
  
  
 
 
 
